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THE PATRIMONIAL SEA TO THE RESCUE OF
THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA
ALBERTO SZEKELY*
What has been the historically official attitude of Mexico towards
the Gulf of California, and what does international law provide for a
marine area of that type?
During the last twenty years, several sectors of the Mexican com-
munity have alleged that the Gulf of California should be regarded as
an integral part of the Mexican territory.1 They have demanded that
the Government proceed, in the national interest, to close the Gulf.
To substantiate these allegations and demands, they have invoked the
existence of a legal, historic title supported by international law.
While the President of Mexico toured fifteen countries of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America in 1975, the Mexican Government an-
nounced, from Alexandria, Egypt, its definite plans to claim a two
hundred mile patrimonial sea or exclusive economic zone, a measure
which would have the logical and immediate effect of, among other
things, closing the Gulf of California to foreign fishermen. 2 In order
to proceed with these previously announced intentions,' the Mexi-
can Government will introduce a bill to the Federal Congress.
Following is an analysis of the international law governing the
regime of the waters of the Gulf of California, to facilitate a judg-
ment on the legality of the Mexican action.
Mexico emerged in 1821 at the end of its war of independence to
inherit its territory from Spain under the principle of Uti possidetis.
The first occasion on which the Mexican Government took action to
*Lic. en Der. (U. of Mexico), M.A. (Fletcher), M.A.L.D. (Fletcher), Ph.D. (Univ. College,
London). Professor of International Law, National Autonomous University of Mexico.
1. Professors Paul Cervantes Ahumada, Jose Salgado y Salgado, Modesto Seara Vazquez,
and Cesar Sepulveda are among the main supporters of the idea of regarding the Gulf of
California as an integral part of the Mexican territory. The opposition party of Mexico,
Partido Accion Nacional, was among the promoters of the Gulf's closure. See note 8, infra.
2. Cerrara Mexico el Mar de Cortes, Ultimas Noticias, Segunda Edicion, Mexico, 5 agosto,
1975; Reivindica 18 el Derecho de Mexico sobre 3 Millones de Kms. 2 de Mares, Excelsior, 5
agosto, 1975.
3. In April of 1974, Foreign Minister Emilio C. Rabasa stated that Mexico would legislate
its patrimonial sea at the time of the opening of the Caracas Session of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (June 20-August 28, 1974). The reason why this an-
nounced purpose was not carried out may be that the Mexican Government decided to wait
for the results of the Conference, so as to back its claim with the support of the consent of
the international community (Excelsior, 27 abril, 1974).
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delimit precisely its marine sovereignty was in 1848. The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, concluded that year with the United States, set
the Mexican territorial sea at 9 miles from shore.4 In 1902, the
Mexican legislature reduced the territorial sea to 3 miles,5 a measure
which was subsequently modified in 1935,6 by returning to the
breadth of 9 miles. In 1966, a claim was made for an additional,
exclusive fishing zone of 3 miles. 7 None of the domestic legislative
instruments referred to make a claim of internal character for the
waters of the Gulf of California. These instruments should be under-
stood to claim a territorial sea around the internal coasts of the Gulf.
The waters contiguous to the territorial sea in the interior of the Gulf
were regarded as high seas.
In 1965, the opposition party, the Partido Acci6n Nacional
(PAN), unsuccessfully introduced a bill in Congress to extend the
territorial sea of the country to 12 miles and to close the Gulf of
California.8 Had this initiative been approved, a line would have been
drawn across the mouth of the Gulf, and the waters of the Gulf
would have become internal waters of Mexico. The imaginary line
across the mouth, then, woud have served as the base line for measur-
ing the territorial sea to the South, toward the open Pacific Ocean.
At the same time, a number of distinguished Mexican international
lawyers formulated similar proposals.9
Despite the fact that the PAN initiative did not prosper in Con-
gress,1 I the Executive decided to look into the matter. It formed an
inter-ministerial commission whose task it was to propose a course of
action under international law. The commission,' ' in analyzing the
positive international law in force on the subject, found the follow-
ing regime for gulfs or bays:
According to Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
4. Articulo V of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Limits, Feb. 2, 1948.
5. Aritculo 4/1, Ley de Bienes Inmuebles, Dec. 18, 1902.
6. Diario Oficial, Aug. 31, 1935.
7. Decree of Dec. 13, 1966. (Diario Oficial, Jan. 20, 1967). In 1969, the territorial sea
was increased to 12 miles (Decree of Dec. 12, 1969; Diario Oficial, Dec. 26, 1969).
8. Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Cumara de Diputados. "Iniciativa para
reformar Los articulos 27, 42 y 48 de La Constitucion Politica de Los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos para incluir expresamente el Golfo de California dentro del territorio nacional,
bajo el dominio de la Federacion, suscrita par los C.C. Diputados a La XLVI Legislatura,
miembros del Partido Accion Nacional." Mexico, Nov. 18, 1965.
9. See note 1, supra.
10. Antonio Gomez Robledo suggests that the reason why the proposed bill did not
prosper might have been the fear of the PAN House Representatives that their allegations
could be challenged successfully by the United States. (El Derecho del Mar en La Legis-
lacion Mexicana. Sinopsis Historico Evolutiva, in Mexico y el Regimen del Mar (vol. I),
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, at 101 (1974).
11. Basic Documents in International Law (Ian Brownlie, ed.), 2d Ed., 79-88 (1972).
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Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,1 2 a bay may be regarded,
geographically, as such when its total area is equal to or larger than
the area enclosed in an imaginary semi-circle whose imaginary diam-
eter is a line drawn across the mouth of the alleged bay. Once a bay
can be regarded as a geographical bay under the terms of the Con-
vention, Article 7 provides that its waters may be considered as
internal waters of the country in question when the imaginary line
drawn across the mouth of the bay does not exceed 24 miles.
Because the mouth of the Gulf of California is comparatively
narrow when compared with the extension of the Gulf to the north,
the required semi-circle encloses an area much smaller than the total
area of the Gulf. Thus, the Gulf of California is a geographical bay,
under the provisions of the Convention. However, the imaginary line
which is drawn across the mouth of the Gulf of California exceeds
the 24 mile requirement. It measures approximately 110 miles. In
other words, the Gulf of California cannot be regarded as internal
waters of Mexico, and this situation was recognized and accepted by
the Commission.
However, the Commission found that Article 4 of the Convention
provided an alternative system to measure the territorial sea where
deep indentations in the coast or a series of islands along the coast
exist. Briefly, in this system, designed in 1951 by the International
Court of Justice in its decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case,' the coastal State may draw straight baselines between the
outermost points of the indentations or islands, and the waters en-
closed by the baselines could be regarded as internal waters. The
baselines, then, would serve as the point for measuring the territorial
sea outwards.
Fortunately for Mexico, nature located a series of islands just
above the middle of the Gulf of California. These are the islands of
San Esteban and Turrera, the latter being immediately to the south
of Tibur6n Island. Also, along the western side of the Gulf, to the
south of these islands, and in a few places on the eastern side of the
Gulf, several series of islands and deep indentations exist.
The Commission proposed straight baselines wherever possible; as
a result, almost the entire northern half of the Gulf may be closed by
straight baselines. The waters enclosed became, officially, internal
waters, on August 30, 1968, when a decree was issued to that
effect.'" The areas in the western and eastern sides of the southern
12. I.C.J. Reports, at 132 (1951).
13. Diario Oficial, Aug. 30, 1958. Numerous amendments to errors in the Decree were
published in the Diario Oficial of Oct. 5, 1968.
14. L. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in International Law 28 (1964).
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half of the Gulf were also enclosed, to give Mexico about 50% of the
area of the Gulf. The remaining southern half of the Gulf, outside
the area of the territorial sea parallel to the coast, remained as high
seas.
Most of the Mexican jurists who had advocated the total closure of
the Gulf expressed their unhappiness with the decree, and criticized
the Government for not complying with their conception of the legal
regime applicable to the Gulf. Even though they had to admit that
conventional law was not on their side, they alleged that the Gulf of
California was Mexican, since it was an "historic bay."
Is the Gulf of California an Historic Bay?
The historic bay is an institution which is far from being clearly
and definitely regulated by customary international law; it is not
included in the conventional law integrated by the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea. It applies to certain waters
which, not being bays in the legal sense described by the 1958 con-
vention due to the excessive breadth of the mouth, may still be
claimed by the coastal State, provided that a series of requirements
are fulfilled.
According to L. J. Bouchez,' I the foremost authority on the
subject, there are five indispensable requirements for a valid claim to
an historic bay:
1. The claimed marine zone must be adjacent to the coast of the
claiming State.
2. The waters must be claimed by the State in its capacity as a
sovereign.
3. The pretended sovereignty must be effectively exercised and
for a sufficiently prolonged period of time.
4. The situation thus created must be a matter of common
knowledge, at least by the States directly interested.
5. The international community of States and the States directly
affected must have expressed their acquiescence in respect to the
claimed territorial rights.
There is no doubt that Mexico is in a position to fulfill the first
two requirements. This is not the case, however, with the other
three. Unfortunately, Mexico could have but did not claim effective
and continued sovereignty over the Gulf from the time it became
independent.' 6 This was probably the result of the ignorance or lack
of foresight of its governments.
15. This is also the opinion of Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, Derecho del Mar. Apuntes
sobre el sistema Legal mexicano, 50 Foro Internacional, El Colegio de Mexico, octubre-
diciembre, at 253 (1972).
16. See note 4 supra.
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Defenders of the "historic bay" thesis advance the following
arguments:
1. Mexico inherited the Gulf from Spain. In that case, Mexico, as
a new nation, rather than notifying its claim to the Gulf persistently
regarded its waters as being part of the High Seas. Internal legislation
makes no mention of the Gulf being an integral part of Mexican
territory. On the other hand, in the previously mentioned 1848
treaty with the United States,' I a 9 mile territorial sea was estab-
lished and no reference made to a claim to the Gulf's waters. Also,
during the first and second World Wars, the presence in the Gulf of
foreign military vessels, some of which, like the Japanese in World
War II, were enemy vessels, were not the object of a protest by the
Mexican government. This silence must be interpreted to say that
Mexico regarded those waters as High Seas. Had that not been so,
Mexico would have regarded the navigation of those vessels through
the waters of the Gulf as an invasion of its territory. Thus, if Mexico
really inherited the Gulf from Spain, it did all possible to abandon
the Gulf once it became independent. This abandonment of sover-
eignty, if sovereignty existed, was the result of ignorance, lack of
interest or foresight of the Mexican authorities.
2. The defenders of the "historic bay" thesis advance only two
examples of the will of Mexico to exercise sovereignty over the Gulf.
First, they resort to the Provisional Statute of the Mexican Empire,
issued by Maximilian in 1865. Article 51 expressly includes as part of
the national territory "the Sea of Cort6s or Gulf of California." True,
under international law, the international act of a State produces
legal effects whenever undertaken by the authority in effective con-
trol of the country. From that standpoint, it makes no difference
that the Statute was issued by an invader who was usurping the legal
authorities of the nation whose leader was Benito Juarez. However,
Maximilian's government was far from being the internationally rec-
ognized government of Mexico, with full capacity to handle its ex-
ternal affairs. Second, the presence of foreign vessels in the Gulf
during the Mexican Revolution in 1914 was in fact the object of a
protest by the Mexican government. It should be noted, however,
that these two cases are isolated, two assertions of sovereignty in a
period of almost 150 years, as opposed to more than a dozen cases
during the same period in which the Mexican government treated the
Gulf as High Seas. This is certainly not an example of effective,
continuous sovereignty.
3. Both the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo8 and the 1853
17. Art. VI.
18. Art. IV.
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Mesilla Treaty1 9 included a clause which provided the right for the
citizens and vessels of the United States, at all times, of free and
noninterrupted transit through the Gulf of California and through
the Colorado River and not by land, without the consent of the
Mexican government.
The defenders of the historic bay thesis contend that through this
clause the United States tacitly recognized Mexico's sovereignty over
the Gulf. In other words, interpreting the clause a contrario sensu,
they say that if the United States had not recognized such sover-
eignty, it would not have had the need to agree on this right of
transit with Mexico.
It must be understood that for a U.S. vessel to navigate to the
Colorado River from the Pacific, and vice versa, it would have to
navigate through the territorial sea of Mexico at the very top of the
Gulf (which was set in that treaty at 9 miles), and through Mexican
internal waters, namely, the portion of the Colorado River between
the Gulf and the border. This author is inclined to interpret the
"freedom of transit" provision in the treaty as applying solely to the
above mentioned Mexican waters, and not throughout the entire
Gulf.
As Professor Gomez Rovledo explains,2" when the Colorado
ceased to be a navigable river due to the uses and abuses to which the
former waterway was subjected in U.S. territory, Mexico had a clear
opportunity to derogate the right of transit of U.S. citizens and thus
ratify its sovereignty. This could have been done by invoking the
termination of the clause of the treaty based on rebus sic stantibus,
that is, a fundamental change of circumstances. Mexico did not take
such action precisely because it had no intention of ratifying some-
thing which it had never claimed.
Moreover, when the clause says that such transit should be made
through the Gulf and not by land, it clearly refers to the land be-
tween the northernmost point of the Gulf and the border in San Luis
Colorado, and not to the land on either side of the Gulf, that is the
entire peninsula of Baja California on the west, or the states of
Sinalos and Sonora to the east. Therefore, this transit provision
applies only to the land between the top of the Gulf and the border,
and not to the 1,166.5 kilometers between the mouth and the top of
the Gulf.
4. A number of additional arguments are advanced by the sup-
19. Supra note 10, at 104.
20. Professor Modesto Seara Vazquez advances most of the following arguments in La
Politica Exterior de Mexico. La Practica de Mexico en el Derecho Internacional. Mexico.
Editorial Esfinge S.A., at 59 (1969).
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porters of the thesis under consideration.2 1 They allege:
a) Geographical reasons: it is said that the Gulf is within and
surrounded by Mexican territory. However, again, the requirements
of international law are not fulfilled by the geography. It is also said
that the 24 mile criterion is not fair to the Gulf, given the width-
length proportion of its mouth and extension. Its width is 110 miles,
and its length 1,166.5 kilometers, a condition not found in any other
gulf in the world whose coasts belong to one State only. As the case
and configuration of the Gulf is unique, it may seem unfair that the
laws of nations do not provide for this special circumstance, yet
Mexico has taken no action, particularly at the three United Nations
conferences on the Law of the Sea, to remedy the situation through
a proposal to adapt the law.
b) Economic reasons: these undoubtedly are the main concern
of those who have pressured to close the Gulf. They insist that it
should be totally Mexico's because the population and economics of
the Mexican States on the coasts of the Gulf depend very heavily on
the Gulf's resources. Economic reasons, as will be seen here, may
substantiate a claim, but are insufficient to close the Gulf as internal
waters.
c) Political-strategic reasons: it is said that navigation through
the Gulf endangers the national security of Mexico. This position, in
an era of sophisticated weaponry and transcontinental missiles, seems
rather obviously uninformed and illadvised, particularly in peace-
time.
In conclusion, the above reasons and arguments are propositions
de lege ferenda, which would not allow the government to satisfy the
demands of said points. If the above proofs of the fact that Mexico
did not intend to exercise effective and continuous sovereignty are
insufficient, the 1966 decree creating a 3 mile exclusive fishing
zone 2 2 adjacent to the then 9 mile territorial sea should be convinc-
ing, if not conclusive. Mexico, after that decree, recognized the
historic rights of the U.S. and Japan to fish within 3 miles of the
coasts of Mexico and including the coasts of the Gulf. In 1968, both
the U.S. and Japan agreed to treaties providing for a 5 year phaseout
system2 3 during which those countries would have the right to con-
21. See note 7 supra.
22. The treaties were concluded in accordance with Transitory Article 3 of the 1966
Decree.
23. The "Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States on traditional fishing in the exclusive fishery zones contiguous to the territorial seas
of both countries," of Oct. 27, 1967, may be foundin United Nations Legislative Series.
National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, U.N. ST/LEG/SER.B/16
New York, 494-99 (1944). In the same publication at 502-05 the "Agreement between
January 1977]
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tinue fishing.2 4 The fact that Mexico, through those treaties, ex-
pressly limited its rights to the 12 miles from the coast (9 of
territorial sea and 3 of fishing zone) clearly indicates that it regarded
the rest of the Gulf as High Seas.
The 1968 decree, which internalized the waters of the northern
half of the Gulf, using the system of straight baselines, as some of the
advocates of the total closure of the Gulf painfully admitted to
themselves, implied the incontestable proof of Mexico's recognition
of the High Seas character of the southern half of the Gulf.
However, the Law of the Sea will have the effect of closing the
Gulf through the 200 mile economic zone or patrimonial sea thesis.
The thesis, which originated in some countries of South America
almost thirty years ago,2" is no longer a proposition de lege ferenda;
it is now a proposition de lege lata. It has received the support of 115
countries at the 1974 Caracas Session of the Third UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea.2 6 Mexico has embraced the thesis since
197227 and was waiting to implement it until the conclusion of a
treaty by the Conference. Since the Conference is nowhere near
concluding its work, since the concept of the patrimonial sea was
agreed upon in Caracas through a customary legal channel, and since
Mexico feels it cannot wait to protect its resources from foreign
abuse, Mexico feels it is time to make its patrimonial sea claim. This
claim is in keeping with the spirit of the law being developed by the
Japan and the United Mexican States on fishing by Japanese vessels in the waters contiguous
to the Mexican territorial sea," signed on March 7, 1968, may be found.
24. The first 200 mile claims were made by Chile and Peru, on June 23 and Aug. 1 of
1947, respectively. U.N. LEG/SER.B/1, at 6-8 and 16-18, respectively (1951). Since then,
several other Latin American countries have made similar ?claims to either a 100 mile
territorial sea (Brazil, Ecuador and Panama) or an economic zone or patrimonial sea (Argen-
tina, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay).
25. See records of the 21st to 42nd Plenary Meetings of the Conference (Docs.
A/CONF.62/SR.21 to 42), in Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, 59-189.
26. At the Third Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) on April 19, 1972, President Luis Echeverria stated that Mexico would struggle
at the World Conference on the Law of the Sea for the juridical recognition, through
conventional means, of a 200 mile patrimonial sea (El Trimestre Economico, Vol. XXXIX,
Num. 155, at 665-73 (1972). Also, Mexico participated very actively in the adoption of the
Declaration of Santo Domingo of June 7, 1972, which supported a patrimonial sea (U.N.
Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 589-601 (1974). Subsequently, Mexico co-
sponsored, with Colombia and Venezuela, a document entitled "Draft Articles of a Treaty"
which was submitted to Subcommittee II of the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee on
April 2, 1973 (Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21), which proposed a patrimonial sea. Finally, at
the Caracas Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1974, Mexico
introduced, together with Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, New Zealand,
and Norway, a working paper which advocated a 200 mile economic zone (Doc. A/CONF.
62/L.4, of July 26, 1974).
27. See note 3 supra.
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Conference, and in accordance with the expressed will of the inter-
national community. Mexico might have acted much earlier on the
200 mile economic zone but, as this paper established, the country
has traditionally been, at least in the field of the Law of the Sea,
respectful of the international law in force.
The first important effect of the upcoming 200 mile patrimonial
sea claim is that the resources of the Gulf of California will be
exclusively Mexico's. For resource purposes, the Gulf will be closed.
Freedom of fishing in the area will thus be derogated. As the govern-
ment announced, the other three traditional freedoms of the High
Seas will be respected, namely, the freedoms of overflight, of naviga-
tion, and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. The general
international law, not Mexico alone, is giving the Gulf of California
to Mexico. Together with exclusivity over the living and non-living
resources in the waters, soil and subsoil of the 200 miles, Mexico will
prevent the pollution of the Gulf's environment in order to fully
protect its delicate ecological balance.
Some of the jurists who originally asked for total closure of the
Gulf are not yet content. They still feel that the Gulf should be
nationalized and all traditional freedoms derogated. Their position is
not congruent with the intentions that led them originally to em-
brace closure. Their concern was primarily, if not exclusively, eco-
nomic. All their concerns are completely remedied by the
implementation of the patrimonial sea, since:
a) The Gulf will be closed for fishing purposes;
b) The Colorado has ceased being a navigable river from the Gulf;
thus the Gulf and navigation through it lead nowhere, and no
foreign State needs navigate the Gulf;
c) Given the geographical configuration of the Gulf, no State is
interested in laying submarine cables and pipelines across the
Gulf;
d) The international community will cease to have an interest in
potential rights in the Gulf; international law will cease to have a
practical application in the zone. Does an international law rule
subsist when the interest of the international community it seeks
to protect has ceased? Here again, rebus sic stantibus may be the
answer.
Mexico should promote among the members of the international
community an agreement to close the Gulf of California for all pur-
poses, since only Mexico has an effective interest in it. Mexico should
do this, instead of acting unilaterally, especially at this moment in
time when any action outside the expressed spirit of the Third
January 1977]
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United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea might endanger
the possibilities for success of the Conference.
As can be appreciated, the question of Mexico's claim to the Gulf
of California has been affected more by internal differences on the
conception of the applicable lege lata than external differences.
The party most adversely affected by the implementation of the
patrimonial sea in the Gulf is the American Tunaboat Association.
These fishermen have, for the most part, abused the freedom of
fishing that until recently has prevailed in the southern half of the
Gulf, through indiscriminate, arbitrary and unreasonable fishing prac-
tices. They are not in a position to contest this designation of patri-
monial sea, since its legality and desirability has already been
internationally supported by their own country. This expressed inter-
national support by the United States of the patrimonial sea concept
and the bill now pending passage in the American Congress to create
a patrimonial sea off the coasts of the United States are an additional
guarantee that the economic disclosure of the Gulf of California by
Mexico is a more than feasible reality.
